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 Abstract: 150 





People with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) show reduced sensitivity to contextual stimuli in 
many perceptual and cognitive tasks. We investigated whether this also applies to decision-making 
by having adult participants make a series of choices between consumer products. Participants’ 
preferences between a given pair of options frequently switched when the third item in the set was 
changed, but this tendency was reduced among individuals with ASC, indicating more consistent and 
conventionally rational choices. A comparison of people with low- vs high-levels of autistic traits 
drawn from the general population revealed a weaker version of the same effect. The reduced 
context-sensitivity was not due to differences in noisy responding, and although the ASC group took 
longer over their decisions this did not account for the enhanced consistency of their choices. The 
results extend the characterization of autistic cognition as relatively context-insensitive to a new 







 People with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) often show atypical performance on tasks 
that require processing of local information independently of its context (Behrmann, Thomas, & 
Humphreys, 2006; Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006). For example, people with ASC are better than 
controls at finding figures embedded in complex shapes, their visual search is less affected by the 
number and similarity of distractors, and they often fail to take semantic context into account when 
pronouncing homographs (see Happé & Frith, 2006, for a review). Non-clinical samples scoring high 
for autistic traits display a similar pattern of performance (e.g., Stewart, Watson, Allcock, & Yaqoob, 
2009). This reduced impact of context may reflect an inability to integrate information into a 
coherent whole (Frith, 1989), but may also be understood solely in terms of a superior ability to 
process local information (Plaisted, Saksida, Alcántara, & Weisblatt, 2003). 
 We investigated whether the reduced context-sensitivity that characterizes ASC extends 
to decision making. Decision-making is a fundamental cognitive operation that has received 
relatively little attention from autism researchers (Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2015; Luke, Claire, Ring, 
Redley, & Watson, 2012). Most previous studies have focused on how people with ASC represent 
and evaluate probabilities and rewards, often using tasks in which the decision-maker must learn the 
payoffs and probabilities of different options by making a series of choices and receiving feedback 
(e.g., Mussey, Travers, Klinger & Klinger, 2015). We took a different approach by examining whether 
autistic traits correlate with altered context-sensitivity in a riskless choice task, where the participant 
simply selects the best alternative from explicitly-stated attribute values.  
 Conventional accounts of rational choice dictate that a person’s preference between two 
items be independent of the other options on offer: if one prefers salmon to steak, this should not 
change just because frogs’ legs are added to the menu (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). However, the choices 
of neurotypical adults are heavily influenced by the composition of the choice set; rather than 
independently assessing the subjective value of each alternative, the attractiveness of a given option 
depends on how it compares with the other values that are simultaneously present (Huber, Payne, & 
Puto, 1982; Simonson, 1989; Tversky, 1972). One of the most striking examples is the “attraction 
effect”, which arises when people choose between two options, A and B, that “trade off” two 
dimensions – for example, USB drives differing in capacity and longevity (Figure 1). When the choice 
set includes a third, “decoy” option that is fractionally worse than A on both dimensions, people very 
rarely choose the decoy, but its presence boosts the tendency to choose A rather than B – and vice-
versa if the decoy targets option B. This kind of context-induced preference reversal occurs in many 
domains (e.g., Farmer, El-Deredy, Howes, & Warren, 2015), has been extensively modelled (e.g., 
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Trueblood, Brown, & Heathcote, 2014), and is used by marketers to influence consumer behaviour 
(Ariely, 2009).  
If the tendency of people with ASC to prioritize local information and to be relatively 
insensitive to the other elements of the stimulus array extends to decision-making, then they should 
be less influenced by decoy options and make fewer context-induced preference reversals. 
Correspondingly, we hypothesized that adults with ASC would make more consistent choices -- 
indicative of a more rational, independent valuation of alternatives than is seen in the neurotypical 
population. This possibility is important because choice-consistency is regarded as normative in 
conventional economic theory, so reduced context-sensitivity would provide a new demonstration 
that autism is not in all respects a “disability” (Baron-Cohen, 2000). More importantly, context 
effects on choice speak to the nature and basis of autistic cognition. Many studies of altered 
context-sensitivity among people with ASC focus on perceptual tasks such as pitch discrimination, 
visual search, and motion-coherence, with corresponding theoretical frameworks that emphasize 
“low level” processes such as enhanced perceptual discrimination or altered magnocellular 
sensitivity (see Happé & Frith, 2006, for a review). Altered preferences in a choice task with verbally-
described consumer products would suggest a broader characterization and a need for integrated 
theorizing across levels and domains of processing (Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 
2012). Finally, the possibility of reduced contextual influence has practical implications for the 
economic and social functioning of people with autism spectrum conditions: attraction-effect decoys 
influence many “real world” decisions (e.g., Doyle, O’Connor, Reynolds, & Bottomley, 1999), and 
reduced decoy-sensitivity would result in different financial, consumer, political, and relationship 








Figure 1. The top panels illustrate the configuration of choice sets that elicit the attraction effect. A 
and B are options that “trade-off” two positive attributes; C and D are decoys. Given the choice 
between A, B, and C, people typically choose A, but when the offered A, B, and D they prefer B.  The 
bottom panels illustrate typical trials from the experiment, in this case a choice among USB drives. In 
the bottom left panel, the option at the right is the target, that on the left is the competitor, and the 
top option is the decoy. In the bottom right panel, the option at the left is the target, the option at 




We conducted two studies. Our main experiment compared adults diagnosed with ASC to 
controls. In an additional experiment, we compared participants from the general population who 
scored in the bottom (N = 176) and top (N = 194) deciles of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) 
(Hoekstra et al., 2011), one of several self-report questionnaires that support the existence of a 
spectrum of autistic traits in the general population.  
All participants completed a decision-making task adapted from previous studies of the 
attraction effect (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014). They also completed the International Cognitive Ability 
Resource (ICAR; Condon & Revelle, 2014) and the AQ-Short. The research was approved by the 
6 
 
University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee and all participants provided 
informed consent. 
Main study: Comparing ASC participants with Controls 
Participants. This study was registered on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/7b9au). 
Ninety ASC participants were recruited via the Cambridge Autism Research Centre, a widely-used 
participant pool for both lab- and on-line studies (e.g., Uzefovsky, Allison, Smith, & Baron-Cohen, 
2016). To register as an ASC participant in this database, participants must self-report a diagnosis of 
an ASC, specify its nature (e.g., Autism, Asperger’s syndrome), report the kind of clinician who 
diagnosed them (e.g., psychiatrist) and the clinic/hospital where this took place. (In lab-based 
studies that we have conducted using this participant pool, the vast majority of participants are able 
to bring written evidence of diagnosis). In the present study, we excluded 8 participants who, 
despite being invited to take part via the database mailing list, indicated that they did not have an 
official diagnosis of an ASC. (The presence of any residual “non-genuine” participants in the ASC 
group would simply mean that our tests of group differences are conservative.) Our final sample 
comprised  37 males, 52 females and one who preferred not to say (PNTS), age range 18 to 71 (M = 
43.11, SD=13.73), ICAR range 1 to 16 (M = 10.83, SD = 3.98), and AQ range 62 to 112 (M = 92.5, SD = 
10.57). Country of residence was UK = 70, US = 18 and PNTS = 2. An additional 3 people were 
excluded for failing more than 2 catch trials (which served as an attention/comprehension check, as 
described below; this exclusion criterion was set in advance).  
Two hundred and twelve control participants were recruited via the PureProfile platform 
and comprised 89 males and 123 females, age range 19 to 71 (M = 43.88, SD = 13.5), ICAR range 1 to 
16 (M = 7.25, SD=3.66), and AQ range 41 to 91 (M=65.20, SD=10.04). Country of residence was UK = 
169 and US = 43. An additional 41 people were excluded for failing more than 2 catch trials. Control 
participants were group-matched for age, gender, and residence with the ASC sample. Full 
demographic information including relations between variables is in the Supplementary Materials 
(Tables S3-S5). The sample size was based on recruiting as many ASC participants as possible and 
then calculating the sample of control participants necessary to give approximately 70% power 
based on the difference in proportion of consistent choices observed between the low- and high-AQ 
groups in the AQ study, which was conducted first (higher power would require unfeasibly large 
numbers of control participants) (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Testing took place online 
using custom-written software; only complete datasets from participants aged 18 or over and whose 
ip addresses that had not already been registered were included in the sample.  
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Design and Procedure. The choice task was adapted from previous studies of the attraction 
effect (Noguchi & Stewart, 2014). Participants saw 10 pairs of products, each differing on two 
dimensions (Figure 1).  Each pair was presented twice, once with a decoy that targeted one product 
and once with a decoy that targeted the other, along with 6 catch trials where one product was 
clearly superior to all others. One trio of products (target, competitor, and decoy) was presented on 
each trial. The stimuli are provided in the Supplementary Materials (Table S1). Each trial was 
presented on a separate page headed by text describing the product attribute values, below which 
the three product-descriptions were arranged in a triangle with random allocation of items to 
locations. Participants clicked the item they thought was best and advanced to the next choice. Trial 
order was random except that a product category was not displayed for a second time until all 10 
product-pairs had been displayed once. Cognitive ability was measured by the matrix reasoning, 
three-dimensional rotation, verbal reasoning, and letter and number sequence components of the 
international cognitive ability resource, a validated measure of general cognitive ability tailored for 
on-line testing that comprises 16 items each scored 0 for incorrect and 1 for correct (Condon & 
Revelle, 2014). AQ was measured with the 28 items of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient-Short, each 
scored from 1-4 (Hoekstra et al., 2014). Task order (choice task, ICAR, and AQ) was randomized. 
Additional study: Comparing low-AQ and high-AQ groups 
We also compared people with low- and high-levels of autistic traits drawn from the general 
population. Obtaining a similar pattern among individuals with high AQ-scores as in the clinical 
sample would provide converging evidence for a link between autistic traits and altered decision-
making, and generalize the importance of this finding to a larger section of the population. 
Participants. The additional study comprised two versions that used different stimuli and 
participants. (Version 1 was conducted and analysed first; Version 2 was run as a replication study. 
Because the results are not modulated by Version, we present the results of the combined analysis 
to give the best overall estimate of the effects; results for the separate versions are shown in Figures 
S8 and S9 of the Supplementary Materials.) In Version 1, 965 participants completed the AQ-Short, 
of whom 81 from the bottom decile of AQ scores and 94 from the top decile of AQ scores returned 
to complete the main task. In Version 2, 1008 completed the AQ-Short with 95 from the bottom 
decile and 100 from the top decile returning to complete the main task. Across both versions, an 
additional 18 participants completed the choice task but were excluded for failing more than 2 catch 
trials. Overall, the low-AQ group comprised 85 males, 90 females, and one PNTS, age range 19 to 75 
(M=35.73, SD=11.86), ICAR range 1 to 16 (M=8.18, SD=3.48), AQ range 37 to 54 (M=49.48, SD=3.77). 
The high-AQ group comprised 112 males and 82 females, age range 20 to 69 (M=35.55, SD=10.48), 
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ICAR range 1 to 16 (M=9.53, SD=3.32), and AQ range 79 to 107 (M=85.24, SD=5.38). (Full 
demographic information including relations between variables is in the Supplementary Materials, 
Tables S6-S9). Sample sizes were chosen to achieve more than 80% power to detect a “medium”-
sized effect (d = 0.5) in simple between-group comparisons (Faul et al., 2009). Participants were 
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  
Design and procedure. Participants completed the AQ-short; those in the top and bottom 
deciles were invited back to complete the choice task and ICAR (task order randomized). Version 1 of 
the study used the same stimuli as the ASC experiment; Version 2 used different products, adapted 
from Noguchi & Stewart (2014). The stimuli are included in the Supplementary Materials (Tables S1 
and S2).  
Results 
Context effects among people with ASC 
 Responses to each product pair were placed into one of four categories. Consistent 
choices are those in which the decision-maker chose the same item on both presentations of a 
particular product pair. Attraction-effect preference-reversals are cases where the person’s selection 
switched when the decoy changed (the person chose option A when the decoy targeted A and chose 
B when it targeted B). Non-attraction preference-reversals were preference reversals where the 
person chose the non-target options on both presentations (e.g., A chosen when B is the target and 
B chosen when A is the target). Decoy selections were cases where the person chose the decoy on 
one or both presentations of a given product pair. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the ASC group made more consistent choices than controls, 
t(203.9) = 5.15, p <.001, d = 0.60, CI = [0.34, 0.85], and showed fewer preference reversals 
(attraction effect reversals: t(206.4) = 2.27, p = .024, d = 0.26, CI = 0.01, 0.51]; non-attraction 
reversals t(194.6) = 2.12, p = .035, d = 0.25, CI = [0.00, 0.50]). They also made fewer decoy selections, 
t(294.9) = 5.46, p <.001, d = 0.53, CI = [0.28, 0.78].  We had a surprisingly high proportion of females 
in our ASC sample, but the choices of male and female ASC participants differed very little 
(Supplementary Materials Table S10), indicating that the gender composition does not affect the 




Figure 2. Choice proportions for the four possible outcomes, with standard errors. The left panel 
compares the ASC group with neurotypical (NT) adults. The right panel shows the data from people 
scoring low or high on the Autism-Spectrum Quotient. We analysed the data with a series of mixed 
effects logistic regression analyses that controlled for demographic variables and tested three 
contrasts: consistent choices vs preference reversals; decoy selections versus non-decoy choices; and 
attraction-effect vs non-attraction preference reversals. The ASC group made more consistent choices 
than controls, demonstrating a more conventionally-rational decision style. A weaker version of the 
same effect is present in the AQ study. 
 
 Our primary analysis tested these effects more rigorously with a series of mixed-effects 
logistic regressions that examined the effects of ASC on choice, controlling for age, gender, and 
cognitive ability (conducted using lme4 for R; Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The fixed-
effects predictors were participant-group (control = 0, ASC = 1), ICAR score, gender (female = 0, male 
= 1), and age. In all analyses, the predictors were standardized prior to each regression and we 
included random intercepts for participant and product-pair, and by-product random slopes for the 
effects of group, age, gender, and ICAR score, thereby allowing the effects of these variables to differ 
across product-pairs; random effects were uncorrelated (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; 
dropping the random slopes did not impair model adequacy and led to virtually-identical results). All 
CIs are 95% Wald confidence intervals. 
 Our first regression contrasted consistent choices (coded 1) with preference reversals 
(coded 0). The ASC group made more consistent choices than controls, Bz.ASC = 0.200 CI = [0.059, 
0.341], p = .005, demonstrating reduced context-sensitivity and a more rational decision-making 
style. There was little effect of age, gender, or cognitive ability (Bz.age = 0.093, [-0.046, 0.231], p = 
.190, Bz.gender = 0.078, [-0.062, 0.217], p = .274, Bz.ICAR = 0.096, [-0.062, 0.253], p = .233). 
 We also contrasted decoy-selections (coded 1) against all other choice types (coded 0). 
Decoy selections are rare and represent a form of noisy-responding/inattention (the decoy is 
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manifestly worse than the target option). This kind of error was negatively related to general 
cognitive functioning, Bz.ICAR = -0.679, CI = [-0.944, -0.414], p <.001, and was less prevalent among 
ASC participants than controls, Bz.ASC  = -0.371, CI = [-0.640, -0.102], p =.007, consistent with the 
higher attention-check failure rate in the control group. Decoy selections did not depend on age or 
gender (Bz.age = 0.007, CI = [-0.234, 0.248], p = .954, Bz.gender = 0.036, CI = [-0.214, 0.283], p = .784).   
 Finally, we contrasted attraction-effect and non-attraction preference reversals. Non-
attraction effect choices were again very rare and, like decoy choices, likely reflect noisy responding; 
they were more common among people with lower cognitive ability, Bz.ICAR  = 0.689, CI = [0.357, 
1.021], p <.001, but did not differ between the ASC and control groups, Bz.ASC  = -0.037, CI = [-0.381, 
0.307], p = .834, and were unrelated to age and gender (Bz.age = 0.014, CI = [-0.295, 0.324], p = .929; 
Bz.gender = -0.229, CI = -0.528, 0.069, p = .132).  
 
 
Autistic traits in the general population 
The choice proportions for low-AQ and high-AQ participants are plotted in the right panel of 
Figure 2 and show an attenuated version of the pattern found in the main study: High-AQ 
participants made more consistent choices than did low-AQ participants, t(366.6) = 3.00, p=.003, d 
=0.31, CI = [0.11, 0.52],  and showed fewer attraction-effect preference reversals, t(366.9) = 2.16, p = 
.031, d = 0.22, CI = [0.02, 0.43], although both groups exhibit a clear context effect. The high-AQ 
group also made slightly fewer decoy selections and non-attraction preference reversals [t(355.3) = 
1.40, p = .163, d = 0.15, CI = [-0.06, 0.35], and t(328.8) = 1.80, p = .072, d = 0.19, CI = [-0.02, 0.40], 
respectively]. 
 When applying the regression analyses to this study, we included Version and its 
interactions with all other fixed-effects variables to examine the consistency of the findings across 
participant samples/stimulus sets. As for other variables, Version was standardized prior to each 
regression, and the interaction terms were computed by multiplying the standardized predictors. 
(No random effects involving Version or its interactions were computed, because all participants and 
all product-pairs only arise for one version.) None of the effects were modulated by Version, and 
excluding Version and its interactions made no difference to the results. (Full regression coefficients 
for these terms are shown in Figure S7 of the Supplementary Materials.) 
High-AQ participants were more likely to make consistent choices than low-AQ individuals, 
Bz.AQ = 0.159, CI = [0.011, 0.307], p = .035. In addition, consistent choice was positively related to age, 
Bz.age = 0.171, [0.037, 0.305], p = .013, and more common among males, Bz.gender = 0.243, CI = [0.110, 
0.377], p = <.001; it was also weakly related to cognitive ability (Bz.ICAR =0.148, CI = [-0.006, 0.302], p= 
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.060). The tendency to choose the decoy did not differ between the low-AQ and high-AQ groups, 
Bz.AQ = -0.033, CI = [-0.241, 0.176], p = .758, but, as in the main study, it was negatively related to 
general cognitive functioning, Bz.icar = -0.424, 95% CI = [-0.623,-0.224], p = <.001; it was also slightly 
lower in males, Bz.gender = -0.201, CI = [-0.398, -0.005], p = .044, but was independent of age (Bz.age = -
0.075, CI =[-0.287, 0.138],  p = .490). Finally, non-attraction effect choices were again very rare and 
more prevalent among people of low cognitive ability, Bz.ICAR = 0.538, CI = [0.205, 0.870], p = .002; 
there was no effect of AQ, Bz.AQ = 0.013, [-0.271, 0.297], p = .928 or of gender or age (Bz.gender = -
0.220, CI = [-0.508, 0.068], p = .134; Bz.age = -0.121, CI = [-0.429, 0.186], p = .439). 
 The demographics questions asked participants whether they had ever been diagnosed 
with an autism spectrum condition (response options: “yes”, “no”, “prefer not to say”). Seven out of 
194 (3.6\%) participants in the high-AQ group answered “yes”, versus 0 out of 176 in the low-AQ 
group. Excluding these participants made little difference to the estimated coefficients but the 
confidence intervals increased: for the test of consistent choices vs preference reversals, Bz.AQ = 
0.155, CI = [0.006, 0.304], p = .041. A further 13 high-AQ and 2 low-AQ participants selected “prefer 
not to say”; after also excluding these, Bz.AQ = 0.123, CI = [-0.026, 0.272], p = .107. 
 Thus, independently of the effects of age, gender, and general cognitive performance, 
people scoring high on the AQ made more consistent choices than those with low AQ scores. The 
effect is weaker than in our main study, may reflect the presence of people with ASC in the high-AQ 
sample, and could be driven by different mechanisms (Gregory & Plaisted-Grant, 2016), but it 
provides converging evidence for an association between autistic traits and a reduction in context-
sensitivity during choice. 
 
Additional analyses 
 We probed three possible contributors to the enhanced rationality of the ASC group’s 
choices: a drive for greater internal consistency; a reduction in noisy responding; and a slower, more 
deliberative decision style. Full results for these additional analyses, including regression coefficients 




 One possible reason for a reduction in context-induced preference reversals is that people 
remember their own past choices and strive to be consistent. If the ASC group had better memory, 
or a stronger drive for consistency, then changing the position of the decoy between successive 
presentations of a product pair would have less effect on their choices, as we found, but this would 
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only apply to within-subject preference reversals: the memory/consistency mechanism would 
reduce the ASC participants’ tendency to switch preference when the context changes, but they 
would be just as susceptible as controls to the effects of the decoy when they first encounter a given 
pair of products. However, analysing the first occurrence of each product category revealed the 
same pattern as our main analysis: decoy selection was less common among ASC participants than 
among controls, Bz.ASC = -0.410, CI = [-0.742, -0.078], p = .016, and, more importantly, people with 
ASC were less likely than controls to choose the target item rather than the competitor, Bz.ASC = -
0.131, CI = [-0.228, -0.034], p = .008.  
 The ASC group were therefore less influenced by the decoy even when they had never 
seen the competing options before, indicating a reduced influence of local context rather than an 
effect driven by memory or need-for-consistency. Notably, applying the same analysis to the data 
from our AQ study revealed no effect of AQ-group on the tendency to choose the decoy, Bz.AQ = -
0.056, CI = [-0.328, 0.217], p = .689, or on the tendency to choose the target rather than the 
competitor, Bz.AQ = 0.001, CI = [-0.103, 0.105], p = .980. Thus, consistent with our primary analysis, 
the difference in context-sensitivity between people with ASC and controls was more pronounced 
than the difference between members of the general population with low- and high-AQ scores: we 
only found an effect of AQ-group on the tendency to make within-subject preference reversals, 
whereas ASC corresponded both to fewer preference reversals and to a reduced tendency to select 
the target when a given stimulus pair was encountered for the first time. 
 
Noisy responding 
 Next, we tested whether the enhanced consistency of the ASC group was driven by a 
reduction in random responding rather than an altered sensitivity to contextual stimuli (Pettibone, 
2012). This analysis and the next were not part of our pre-registered analysis strategy but seemed 
like useful explorations. 
 We computed the number of decoy selections across the 20 test trials for each participant 
as an index of noisy responding (Pettibone, 2012), and re-ran the regression analysis that contrasted 
consistent with inconsistent choices with this noisy-responding measure included as a predictor. The 
results were virtually identical to the original analyses: the ASC individuals made more consistent 
choices (fewer preference reversals) than did controls, Bz.ASC  = 0.188, CI = [0.047, 0.329], p = .010, 
and the high-AQ group made more consistent choices than did the low-AQ group, Bz.AQ  = 0.157, CI = 
[0.010, 0.304], p = .037. The index of noisy-responding only weakly predicted the tendency to make 
consistent choices rather than preference reversals (ASC study: Bz.pdecoy = -0.130, CI = [-0.277, 0.017], 
p = .082; AQ study: Bz.pdecoy = -0.124, CI = [-0.263, 0.014], p = .078).  
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 The reduced attraction effect among the ASC group is therefore unlikely to be due to a 
change in random or inattentive choice. 
 
Response times 
 Finally, we examined whether the greater consistency of the ASC group is due to slower, 
more deliberative decision-making. We computed each participant’s mean response time (RT) across 
the 20 test trials and log-transformed these means to normalize the data and reduce the influence of 
extreme values. We examined the relationship between this measure and participant group with 
linear regression (including the same additional predictors as our main analyses) and then assessed 
the association between response times and choice behaviour by re-running our primary analysis 
with the response-time variable added as a predictor. 
 Participants with ASC had longer response latencies than controls, (Geometric means: ASC 
= 24.3 s, CI = [21.9, 27.1]; controls = 17.8 s, CI = [16.3, 19.5]; Bz.ASC  = 0.088, [0.014, 0.163], p = .020). 
However, the effects of ASC on choice behaviour were not altered by including response time as a 
predictor: ASC participants remained more likely to make consistent choices, Bz.ASC  = 0.189, CI = 
[0.048, 0.331], p = .009, and were less likely than controls to make decoy selections, Bz.ASC  = -0.249, 
CI = [-0.495, -0.001], p = .049. In addition, although participants with shorter response times were 
more likely to make decoy selections and non-attraction preference reversals (Bz.logmt = -0.604, CI = [-
0.811, -0.396], p <.001, Bz.logmt = 0.513, CI = [0.172, 0.853], p = .003, respectively), there was no 
meaningful association between response latency and the tendency to make consistent choices 
rather than preference reversals, Bz.logmt = 0.079, CI = -0.059, 0.216], p = .263.  
 Similar results emerged in the AQ study. The response latencies of the low-AQ and high-
AQ groups were very similar to one another (Geometric means: low-AQ = 17.7 s, CI = [16.2, 19.3]; 
high-AQ = 16.8 s, CI = [15.7, 18.0]; Bz.AQ = -0.031, CI = [-0.085, 0.024], p = .269), and although 
participants with shorter response times were more likely to make decoy selections, Bz.logmt = -0.303, 
CI = [-0.521, -0.083], p= .007, there was no association between response latency and the tendency 
to make consistent choices Bz.logmt = -0.001, CI = [-0.137, 0.135], p = .990, and controlling for response 
latency made very little difference to the effect of AQ-group on choice consistency,  Bz.AQ = 0.161, CI 
= [0.013, 0.309], p = .033. 
 In short, participants who rushed their decisions were more likely to make random 
responses, but there is no indication that the reduced context-sensitivity of people with high-AQ or 
ASC is a consequence of them taking longer over their choices. This increased decision time is 
consistent with research showing that people with ASC are reluctant to make a decision at all, rather 





 People with autism spectrum conditions made fewer context-induced preference reversals, 
leading to more conventionally rational decisions. Our results accord with evidence of reduced loss-
gain framing effects when people with ASC make choices between gambles (De Martino et al., 2008) 
and extend the extensive demonstrations of reduced sensitivity to global context in perceptual and 
cognitive tasks to a new domain: ASC participants were more likely to represent the value of each 
attribute or option in isolation rather than being influenced by the other items in the choice set. This 
kind of reduced context-sensitivity has traditionally been labelled “weak central coherence”, a 
diminished ability to integrate local information into a global “gestalt” (Frith, 1989). However, the 
original conception of weak central coherence does not capture enhanced choice-consistency in a 
“high-level” decision task such as ours, where there is no “global percept”. Rather, our data support 
more recent suggestions that autism is characterized by a wide-ranging enhancement of, or 
preference for, local information processing (e.g., Happé & Frith, 1989, Plaisted et al., 2003). 
 Why were people with ASC and autistic traits less susceptible to context effects in our 
choice task? There are many putative mechanisms for context-induced preference reversals (see 
Howes et al., 2016, for a recent review). Two are of particular relevance to ASC. The first posits that 
choices are based on how readily they can be justified, “even when there is no overt need to justify 
to others” (Simonson, 1989, p. 159; see also Pettibone & Wedell, 2000). The target is better than the 
decoy on both dimensions (whereas the competitor is only superior on one), providing a reason for 
choosing the target option and increasing its choice share (Simonson, 1989). Consistent with this, 
the target is rated as more justifiable than the competitor (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000), and the 
attraction effect increases when people believe that they will have to justify their decisions to others 
(Simonson, 1989). The reduced context effect in people with ASC might therefore be a further 
manifestation of their reduced understanding of, or concern for, the likely beliefs and appraisals of 
others (Baron-Cohen, 2002). However, this framework lacks formalization, does not capture a full 
spectrum of context effects, and struggles to account for data from non-human species (e.g., Lea & 
Ryan, 2015). 
 A more precise and general mechanism for a wide range of context effects is offered by 
the multiattribute linear ballistic accumulator model (Trueblood et al., 2014), which posits a linear 
rise-to-threshold of units whose drift rates reflect the value of the corresponding option relative to 
the other items in the set. Difficult discriminations attract more attention, so the similarity of the 
target and decoy means that the target benefits from its favourable comparison with the decoy 
more than the competitor does, producing the attraction effect. Correspondingly, an increase in the 
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discriminability of the target and distractor will reduce the preferential attention to the decoy-target 
comparison and weaken the effect. People with ASC have been found to show enhanced 
discrimination on a range of perceptual tasks , leading to the proposal that autism is characterized 
by an enhanced sensitivity to differences and a reduced processing of common features (Plaisted et 
al., 2003). There is debate about the generality of enhanced discrimination across tasks and domains 
(Happé, 2006), and about the neural mechanisms involved (Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2015), but a 
greater separation of attribute values in representational space among people with ASC provides an 
explanation for our findings that links a wide-ranging model of context effects to a diverse body of 
empirical and theoretical work from studies of autism. 
 Recent work with neurotypical adults has also considered the functional basis for the 
attraction effect. While conventional accounts of rational choice dictate choice consistency, 
emerging Bayesian frameworks construe preference reversals as an adaptive response to 
uncertainty about the value of an option. One account casts the attraction effect as a rational 
inference about the trade-off between attribute dimensions in the marketplace (Shenoy & Yu, 2013). 
A more general model proposes that a decision-maker’s estimate of the utilities of alternatives can 
be improved by using prior estimates based on the ordinal relations between the attributes (Howes 
et al., 2016). The mathematical specification of this model is complex, but the core principle is that 
decision-making is improved when noisy computations of expected-value are supplemented by 
considering the ordering of attribute values: options whose attributes have higher rank-positions on 
the relevant dimensions usually have higher expected value, and the attraction-effect decoy 
increases the rank position of the target (but not the competitor) on its “worst” dimension, so it is 
rational to infer that the target is the better option.  
 These ideas link to developments in theorizing about autism. In particular, Pellicano and 
Burr (2012) have recently proposed that autism is characterized by unusually flat priors (hypopriors), 
such that perception is driven by current sensory input that is little influenced by background 
expectations. Within the Bayesian framework for context effects on choice, such hypopriors would 
entail less reliance on the ordinal relations between option attributes and, correspondingly, a 
reduced tendency to make context-induced preference reversals –- as we observed. Thus, autistic 
traits may avoid the potentially biasing effect of context by sacrificing useful information about the 
likely state of the world, given past experience. 
 Our results suggest several avenues for future research. Straightforward steps include 
examining whether the more conventionally-rational responses of ASC participants extend to other 
types of context effect such as the compromise effect (Simonson, 1989) and gambler’s fallacy 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), exploring the effects of moderating variables such as time-pressure 
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(Pettibone, 2012), and using process-tracing techniques such as eye-tracking to uncover how autistic 
traits shape the processes by which options are sampled and compared (Stewart, Hermens, & 
Matthews, 2016). More broadly, most studies of decision-making in neuropsychiatric conditions 
such as ASC have focused on how people learn, represent and evaluate probabilities and rewards 
(e.g., Damiano, Aloi, Treadway, Bodfish, & Dichter, 2012). The present results show that choice 
behaviour may be atypical even when people simply select the best alternative from explicitly-
stated, risk-free outcomes. Studying the context-sensitivity of such choices has the potential to 
reveal new insights into the decision-making strategies of individuals with a range of 
neuropsychological conditions. 
 Beyond these theoretical and empirical directions, the present findings have practical 
implications for the socioeconomic functioning of people with ASC. The attraction effect influences 
elections (Pan, O’Curry, & Pitts, 1995), legal judgments (Kelman, Rottenstreich, & Tversky, 1996), 
and policy decisions (Herne, 1997). The ability of decoys to shape consumer behaviour has been 
observed in field studies (Doyle et al.,, 1999) and real-world marketing campaigns (Ariely, 2009). Our 
data suggest that people with autistic traits are still influenced by such decoys, but the effect is 
smaller than for the general population, offering some protection against the biases that can result 
from context-induced preference. However, the price they pay for this resistance to contextual 
influence may be a reduction in the potentially adaptive updating of beliefs about optimum choice 
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Table S1. Product categories and attribute values used in the ASC study and in Version 1 of the AQ study. DA 
is the decoy that renders option A the target; DB is the decoy that targets option B. 
Product Attributes A B DA DB 
Cell phone Number of apps 16 32 12 28 
Repair rate (%) 3 5 3.5 5.5 
USB drive Capacity (GB) 16 32 12 28 
Lifespan (months) 36 20 32 16 
Paper towels Strength (0-10) 4 8 3 7 
Absorbency (millilitres) 52 28 46 22 
Orange juice Vitamin C (mg) 34 82 22 70 
Calories (Kcal) 33 69 42 78 
Apartment Size (Square feet) 759 1203 648 1092 
Crime rate (per month) 10 15 11 16 
Printer Cost (cents per page) 7.05 3.61 7.91 4.47 
Speed (pages per minute) 16.7 5.9 13.3 1.5 
Headphones Sound quality (0-100) 68 92 62 86 
Lifespan (months) 24 12 20 10 
Highlighter pen Brightness (0-1) 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.7 
Volume (millilitres) 180 100 160 80 
Walking shoes Durability (months) 8 32 2 26 
Comfort (0-100) 88 64 82 58 
Part-time job Wages ($ per hour) 6.60 8.20 6.20 7.80 
Commuting time (minutes) 20 60 30 70 
 
Table S2. Product categories and attribute values used in Version 2 of the AQ study. A_d is the decoy that 
renders option A the target; B_d is the decoy that targets option B. 
Product Attributes A B DA DB 
Car Safety (0-5) 4 5 3.8 4.8 
Efficiency (mpg) 49.65 31.05 44.25 25.65 
Six-pack beer Price ($) 6.79 3.19 7.22 3.62 
Quality (0-5) 4.10 2.50 3.80 2.20 
Cell phone battery Price ($) 27.50 19.00 30.00 21.50 
Talk time (hours) 14 11 13 10 
Restaurant Atmosphere (0-100) 76 96 72 92 
Food (0-100) 95 74 90 69 
Digital camera Screen Size (inches) 1.2 3 1 2.8 
Zoom (magnification) 10.1x 4.1x 9x 3.0x 
Light bulb Lifetime (hours) 1000 2000 980 1980 
Price ($) 1.20 2.40 1.50 2.70 
Mouthwash  Fresh Breath (hours) 6 12 5 11 
Volume (fluid ounces) 25 16 23 14 
Television Screen size (inches) 40 65 38 63 
Picture quality (0-100) 6.23 4.63 5.5 3.9 
Internet provider Average Speed (Kb per second) 386 646 290 550 
Download limit (GB) 292 150 270 128 
Language course Number of Lessons 10 18 8 16 
Price ($) 30 50 35 55 
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Table S3. Comparison of the Control and ASC samples 
Comparison ASC Control Test Statistic p 
N 90 212 - - 
Males / Females * 37 / 52 89 / 123 χ2 = 0.004 .950 
Residence: UK / US * 70 / 18 169 / 43 χ2 = 0.001 .975 
Mean Age (SD) 43.11 (13.73) 43.88 (13.55) t = -0.445 .657 
Mean ICAR (SD) 10.83 (3.98) 7.25 (3.66) t = 7.328 < .001 
Mean AQ (SD) 92.50 (10.57) 65.20 (10.04) t = 20.840 < .001 
*One person in the ASC group preferred not to state their gender. Two people in the ASC group did not 
indicate their country of residence. The chi-square tests exclude these participants. 
 
Table S4. Correlations between demographic variables for the ASC group. Asterisks indicate a significant 
correlation, p<.05. 
 Age ICAR AQ 
Age    
ICAR -.03   
AQ .00 .01  
Gender .39* .04 .02 
 
Table S5. Correlations between demographic variables for the Control group. Asterisks indicate a significant 
correlation, p<.05. 
 Age ICAR AQ 
Age    
ICAR -.03   
AQ .05 .22*  






Table S6. Means for ICAR, age, and AQ in the high and low AQ groups for the two versions of the AQ study.  
  Mean (SD) 
 Males/ 
Females 
Age AQ ICAR 
Version 1     
Low AQ 44/37 35.42 (11.43) 48.59 (3.97) 7.98 (3.39) 
High AQ 58/36 37.01 (11.79) 86.02 (5.53) 9.46 (3.33) 
Version 2     
Low AQ 41/53 35.99 (12.27) 50.23 (3.43) 8.36 (3.57) 
High AQ 54/46 34.17 (8.92) 84.51 (5.16) 9.59 (3.33) 
     
Combined     
Low AQ 85/90 35.73 (11.86) 49.48 (3.77) 8.18 (3.48) 
High AQ 112/82 35.55 (10.48) 85.24 (5.38) 9.53 (3.32) 
     
 
Table S7. Comparison of the high and low AQ samples (collapsed across study version) 
Comparison High Low Test Statistic p 
n 194 176 - - 
Males / Females * 112/82 85 /90 χ2 = 2.745 .100 
Mean Age (SD) 35.55 (10.48) 35.73 (11.86) t = -0.155 .877 
Mean ICAR (SD) 9.53 (3.32) 8.18 (3.48) t = 3.790 < .001 
Mean AQ (SD) 85.24 (5.38) 49.48 (3.77) t = 74.572 < .001 
*One person in the low AQ group preferred not to state their gender. The chi-square test excludes this 
participant. 
 
Table S8. Correlations between demographic variables for the low-AQ group. Asterisks indicate a significant 
correlation, p<.05. 
 Age ICAR AQ 
Age    
ICAR .06   
AQ .06 -.08  
Gender -.16* .04 .02 
 
Table S9. Correlations between demographic variables for the high-AQ group. Asterisks indicate a 
significant correlation, p<.05. 
 Age ICAR AQ 
Age    
ICAR .08   
AQ -.02 .15*  





Table S10. Response proportions by gender for the ASC participants. The columns show the mean 
proportion of choices of each type and the results of a between-subject Welch-corrected t-test that 
compares the two genders. The 95% CIs for all estimated effect sizes span zero. 
 Mmales (SD) Mfemales (SD) t(df) p d [95% CI] 
Decoy-selection .022 (.048) .037 (.079) 1.10 (85.06) .273 -0.22 [-0.65, 0.21] 
Consistent .757 (.176) .706 (.202) 1.27 (83.52) .209 0.27 [-0.16, 0.70] 
Attraction .192 (.161) .242 (.182) 1.38 (92.95) .171 -0.29 [-0.72, 0.14] 





Figure S1. ASC study: Primary regression analysis 
The panels show the regression coefficients for the mixed-effects logistic regression analyses described in 
the main text. Here and for all other plots of regression coefficients, the error bars show 95% Wald 
confidence intervals and black data points indicate significant effects (p <.05, two-tailed). The panels show 
the coefficients for three contrasts: decoy-selection vs any other outcome, consistent choice vs preference 
reversal, and attraction-effect preference reversal vs non-attraction preference reversal. (BIC values: 








Figure S2. ASC study: First choice proportions 
The plot shows the proportions of times participants in the ASC and neurotypical (NT) control group chose 






















Figure S3. ASC study: Regression analysis of first choices 
The panels show the results of analysing participants’ responses on the first occurrence of each product 
pair. The top panel shows the coefficients from contrasting the tendency to choose the decoy (coded 1) 
with the tendency to choose one of the other options (target or competitor, both coded 1); the bottom 
panel plots the coefficients obtained when contrasting target choices (coded 1) against competitor choices 







Figure S4. ASC study: Controlling for random responding 
The panels show the results of re-running the primary analysis controlling for random responding, indexed 
by the participant’s proportion of decoy selections across the 20 test trials (pdecoy). Note that it would not 
make sense to include pdecoy in the Decoy vs Non-decoy contrast, so only the Consistent Choice vs 
Preference Reversal and Attraction-Effect Preference Reversal vs Non-attraction Preference Reversal 
















Figure S5. ASC study: Comparing decision times 
As described in the main text, for our analysis of decision-times we tested whether the ASC and Control 
groups differed in the mean response time by running a linear regression. The plot shows the regression 






Figure S6. ASC study: Controlling for decision times 
The panels show the results of re-running the primary analysis with each person’s log-transformed mean 
response-time (logmt) as an additional predictor. (BIC values 1516.3, 3404.7, and 641.1 for top, middle, and 









Figure S7. AQ study: Primary regression analysis 
The panels show the regression coefficients for the three contrasts described in the main text. As reported 
in the Methods section, the analyses included the Version variable (Version 1 coded 0; Version 2 coded 1) 
and the interaction between Version and all other variables to examine the consistency of the findings 
across participant samples / stimulus sets. As for other variables, Version was standardized prior to each 
regression, and the interaction terms were computed by multiplying the standardized predictors (e.g., the 
coefficient labelled aq.int is z.aq*z.version). (BIC values for the top, middle, and bottom analyses are: 







Figure S8. AQ study Version 1: Primary regression analysis 
The panels show the regression coefficients for the three contrasts described in the main text, limited to 
the data from the first version of the study. (BIC values for the top, middle, and bottom analyses are: 815.8, 












Figure S9. AQ study Version 2: Primary regression analysis 
The panels show the regression coefficients for the three contrasts described in the main text, limited to 
the data from the second version of the study. (BIC values for the top, middle, and bottom analyses are: 











Figure S10. AQ study: First choice proportions 
The plot shows the proportions of times participants in the low- and high-AQ groups chose the target, 





Figure S11. AQ study: Regression analysis of first choices 
The panels show the results of analysing participants’ responses on the first occurrence of each product 
pair. The top panel shows the coefficients from contrasting the tendency to choose the decoy (coded 1) 
with the tendency to choose one of the other options (target or competitor, both coded 1); the bottom 
panel plots the coefficients obtained when contrasting target choices (coded 1) against competitor choices 







Figure S12. AQ study: Controlling for random responding 
The panels show the results of re-running the primary analysis controlling for random responding, indexed 
by the participant’s proportion of decoy selections across the 20 test trials (pdecoy). Note that it would not 
make sense to include pdecoy in the Decoy vs Non-decoy contrast, so only the Consistent Choice vs 
Preference Reversal and Attraction-Effect Preference Reversal vs Non-attraction Preference Reversal 






Figure S13. AQ study: Comparing decision times 
As described in the main text, for our analysis of decision-times we tested whether the low-AQ and high-AQ 
groups differed in the mean response time by running a linear regression. The plot shows the regression 






Figure S14. AQ study: Controlling for decision times 
The panels show the results of re-running the primary analysis with each person’s log-transformed mean 
response-time (logmt) as an additional predictor. (BIC values 1670.8, 3983.2, and 717.2 for top, middle, and 
bottom analyses, respectively.) 
 
